MULTI-STAGE HIERARCHICAL GAMES: EXISTENCE AND STABILITY WHEN THE OPTIMAL RESPONSES ARE UNIQUE
Our main objects are two-person, multi-stage, Stackelberg games. We consider feedback solutions. Existence and variational stability of equilibria have been established under minimal assumptions when the optimal responses are unique.
Stackelberg games, Nash equilibrium, feedback solutions, repeated play, data perturbations.
Received: February 20, 2023; Accepted: March 27, 2023; Published: April 19, 2023
How to cite this article: Nunzia A. D’Auria, Multi-stage hierarchical games: existence and stability when the optimal responses are unique, Far East Journal of Applied Mathematics 116(2) (2023), 133-147. http://dx.doi.org/10.17654/0972096023008
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